C O N F I D E N T I A L BUENOS AIRES 001305
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/2028
TAGS: PREL, MARR, PGOV, PHUM, AR
SUBJECT: ARGENTINA: AMBASSADOR, DEFENSE MINISTER
WORK THE DETAILS OF MIL-MIL COOPERATION DESPITE
RISING BILATERAL TENSIONS

REF: A. BUENOS AIRES 1300
B. SECDEF 110144Z SEP 08

1. © Summary: Ambassador paid a call on Argentine Defense Minister Nilda Garre September 15 to take stock of cooperative efforts over the coming year and to address a handful of obstacles to deeper collaboration. Garre took note of the new areas of cooperation that would become available if the GOA followed through on its announced plans to pay off Paris Club debt, thereby overcoming Brooke Sanctions. She was noncommittal on the Fourth Fleet, but interested in the fact that Brazil, Chile and Ecuador, among others, had assigne liaison officers to its headquarters. She was also non-committal toward reconsidering participation in UNITAS Gold, though her deputy Secretary Forti asked about details of available USG support if Argentina chose to participate. Garre voiced appreciation for U.S. assistance in training and reform efforts at the Ministry and left open the possibility of working out differences over a previously agreed Information Assurance/Cyber Security program. Secretary Forti raised concerns about our recent experience of rejecting a Peruvian and a Colombian military officer for a U.S.-sponsored training within the Argentina National Defense School and requested greater advance notice of vetting requirements (MilGP Commander encouraged the MOD to get participant names to us early in the process). Garre’s decision to follow through on the meeting with Ambassador was significant given current difficulties in the U.S.-Argentina relationship flowing from the Miami trial of Franklin Duran (reftel), and she evinced no disposition to scale back collaboration. End Summary.

2. (SBU) Ambassador called on Defense Minister Nilda Garre September 15 to review current and planned U.S.-Argentina military cooperation and to touch base following Garre’s September 4 meeting with Secretary Gates at the Western Hemisphere Defense Ministerial in Banff, Canada. Garre was accompanied by her two senior deputies, Secretary for International Affairs Alfredo Forti and Secretary for Military Affairs German Montenegro. Ambassador was accompanied by Mil Group Commander, Naval Attache, and by Pol-Mil Officer (notetaker). Garre was pleasant and professional throughout, if occasionally non-responsive on some issues raised by the Ambassador. She raised no agenda items on her own in the meeting.

Brooke Sanctions, UNITAS, Fourth Fleet

--------------------------------------

3. © Ambassador began by congratulating Garre on her government’s decision to pay its Paris Club arrears, noting that payment of the U.S. portion of that debt would facilitate the removal of Brooke Sanctions and potentially make avaQable to Argentina Foreign Military Financing (FMF), Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative (GPOI) material support, and access to Excess Defense Articles (EDA). Garre agreed these could be useful tools, while Forti clarified the nature of FMF and EDA programs. Ambassador then noted that we remained hopeful that Argentina would reconsider participation in UNITAS Gold exercises, explaining that the U.S. Government had USD 900,000 available to support Argentine participation. Forti asked for confirmation that this could be used for such things as fuel, which we provided. Garre was noncommittal on the point.

4. (SBU) Garre was also neutral when the Ambassador raised the establishment of the Fourth Fleet, which she has publicly questioned. Garre took on board the Ambassador’s suggestion that Argentina consider a visit to the fleet headquarters in Mayport, Florida, or the establishment of a permanent liaison officer. Garre asked for confirmation that Brazil, Chile, and Ecuador had established liaison officers and seemed surprised that they had.

Cruz del Sur

------------

5. (SBU) Ambassador reiterated to Garre that the U.S. Government stood ready to support the introduction of the Argentine-Chilean peacekeeping brigade within the UN system when the two countries were ready to move forward. The Minister said that they hoped to establish the brigade, designated Cruz del Sur (Southern Cross), by the end of the year, but that this depended in part on the Argentine Congress giving its authorization. She said she would be discussing the brigade during a visit to Chile September 18 for its national day (at which, she said, she had planned to see the Bolivian Defense Minister as well, though she doubted that would be possible). Garre said she was pleased to host the PKO Americas exercise in 2009. Asked whether Cruz del Sur could formally participate, Garre said that would not be possible until it was officially established, but that Chilean and Argentine militaries would participate separately.

Training and Reform

-------------------

6. (SBU) Garre noted the challenges she was facing in reforming Argentina’s defense procurement procedures and was pleased that the U.S. would be sending experts to an end of October conference on defense logistics. She said that Argentina sought to learn from the U.S. experiences and that progress had been made. The Ambassador agreed it was a difficult challenge in any country, noting U.S. controversies around the contract for an aerial refueling tanker. Separately, Garre said that her Ministry was nearly done with the establishment of a comprehensive travel plan and training request system to facilitate faster turnaround on training opportunities. MilGrp Commander noted the importance of avoiding cancellations within 30 days of planned trainings, which made it impossible to nominate alternatives or preserve the funding. Garre and her Secretaries acknowledged the importance of making their new procedures work. Montenegro asked that the USG consider bringing back an expert in capabilities based strategic planning to assist a small high-level group in the Ministry.

Information Assurance/Cyber Security

------------------------------------

7. © Ambassador raised our disappointment that the planned project on information assurance/cyber security, the subject of an agreed-upon bilateral MOU and an approved initial USD 100,000 in funding, had been brought to a point where the funding would be lost due to continuing disagreements over procedures and participation. Garre had asked her Secretaries to be prepared on this point, and they argued that the MOD had only modified its approach upon recognizing that other parts of the government had equities in the effort, in particular the Public Operations Secretariat (SGP). The GOA recognized that the funding was about to be lost. MILGP Commander pointed out that we had no problem including other parts of the GOA, but that our understanding from the GOA’s response was that the SGP along with the MOD would each receive a place on the steering committee, compared to one seat for the USG. Forti and Montenegro said that this was not their understanding of what was being asked. Garre noted that the Sub-Secretary for Legal Affairs was in Germany, further complicating prospects to conclude the deal, but agreed it would be worthwhile to follow up to see if the differences could be overcome.

Helos

-----

8. (SBU) Garre voiced appreciation for the delivery of two H3 Sea King helicopters at Bahia Blanca, saying that she had just seen them but had been prevented from flying because at the time a minor part or issue had yet to be resolved. Ambassador invited Garre to consider joining him for a ribbon-cutting once they were operational. Ambassador later congratulated Garre on the Army’s Aviation branch’s success in qualifying with Bell Helicopter/Textron to perform Huey II Kit upgrades for Argentine as well as Uruguayan and Paraguayan operators.

Vetting Challenge

-----------------

9. (SBU) Secretary Forti raised the one issue initiated by the Argentine side during the meeting, requesting our help to avoid a repeat of the vetting issue that has arisen for two non-Argentines (one from Peru, one from Colombia) participating in a U.S.-funded Defense Logistics program as part of their year-long course of study at the Argentine National Defense School. Both had been identified for associations with human rights violations by Department vetting, long after they had joined the Argentine program in which the U.S. training was one element. Forti, seconded by Garre, asked what could be done to avoid such an embarrassing situation for Argentina, which had had to prevent the visitors’ participation. MilGrp Commander noted that he had discussed with a MOD official in mid-August the emergence of the first rejection and had coordinated on solutions (Garre complained to her deputies that she had not been informed until the eve of her September 4 meeting with Secretary Gates). We agreed that the early sharing of information on proposed participants was key. Garre said that in fact Argentina too wished to avoid hosting human rights violators, but that early notification of our findings was key (Note: Her comment was significant, because it represented the first time an Argentine interlocutor has implicitly supported the basis of our refusal).

Comment: Positive, Restrained

-----------------------------

10. © Coming as it did amidst virulent anti-U.S. bashing by some members of Government and non-government supporters of the Kirchners outside government (reftel), the meeting was notably free from ideological posturing by Garre or her lieutenants as has been the case in Ambassador’s previous meetings with her. That she agreed to follow through with the meeting was itself a positive - though Secretary Forti intervened before the meeting to cancel the Embassy photographer. (During our previous period of Miami case-related bilateral tension, the Ambassador was embargoed from official meetings with Cabinet ministers except for the Foreign Minister.) She gave a slightly positive signal, even if lQly too late, on the information assurance project, and was restrained in her remarks this time on the Fourth Fleet. In all, it was a constructive meeting in which she gave her clear approval for continued collaboration on several fronts. End Comment.

WAYNE

C O N F I D E N T I A L BUENOS AIRES 002711
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
PM/RSAT FOR JEFFREY BURNETT
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2016
TAGS: MARR, PARM, PREL, PGOV, PTER, AR
SUBJECT: ARGENTINA: SCENESETTER FOR PM/DAS MICHAEL COULTER
AND THE POL/MIL BILATS

REF: BUENOS AIRES 621

Classified By: CDA Michael Matera for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

1. © Summary: The U.S. Embassy in Buenos Aires, warmly welcomes you and your official delegation to Argentina December 15 for a discussion of bilateral political-military issues. The Kirchner administration continues to be a valued and positive partner on a wide range of security issues, from non-proliferation and military to military relations, to counterterrorism and counternarcotics. Argentina serves as a stabilizing force in the region and can continue to help the United States achieve its hemispheric security goals. The long-term success of Argentine efforts, however, depends on U.S. engagement, training and assistance.

2. © Your visit comes at a time when the MoD is pushing to complete an intense restructuring of the Argentine Armed Forces, and the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense are reevaluating their commitment and ability to participate in the Proliferation Security Initiative. Brooke Sanctions limit the USG’s ability to provide some forms of assistance. Some of the issues I believe we should focus on, or be aware of, for the December 15 Pol-Mil bilats are: a) recognize and encourage the strong and cooperative relationship we enjoy on the range of security issues; b) encourage Argentina’s continued strong support for PKO, particularly MINUSTAH; c) seek mechanism(s) under which U.S. forces can conduct bilateral combined exercises on Argentine territory; and d) find a way to keep Argentina (and the military) engaged in PSI, recognizing their limited capacity. END SUMMARY.

Non-Proliferation and PSI

-------------------------

3. (U) The GOA has been a strong international voice on arms control and nonproliferation issues. On Iran, the GOA voted to refer Iran’s noncompliance to the UNSC at the September 24 IAEA Board of Governors meeting. Argentina remains the only country in South America to have endorsed the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles (in March 2005).

4. (U) Initially, and despite its relative isolation, Argentina was an enthusiastic participant, involving itself as much as possible in PSI over the last two years. (Note: A complete history of Argentina’s involvement in PSI can be found in ref. A, http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/buenosaires.< /a> End Note). However, for many fiscally challenged countries like Argentina (and elsewhere in the region), full participation is constrained by tight government budgets in general and very tight military spending in particular. This especially applies to events that take place well outside the region. The ability of the GOA to participate in a given meeting or exercise is directly related to its distance from Argentina.

5. © There is also a political aspect to the problem. Although neither the MFA nor the MoD have the resources to send the kind of delegation the OEG is expecting, the MFA has always been more enthusiastic about PSI than the MoD leadership—although the MoD has always said the right things. The MFA’s Office of International Security (DIGAN) continues to quietly work this issue, and other relevant agencies are interested as well. At least for the time being, however, Argentina will likely be unable to participate as envisioned. From our conversations here, it is clear that there are strong interests at many levels to continue active participation in PSI, but the full political commitment from the leadership is lacking. Ambassador Kelly’s Office of International Security, Space and Nuclear Affairs at the MFA has identified this as an issue they would like to discuss at the bilats, and I recommend we take them up on it and discuss options/scenarios for keeping the GoA engaged as effective partners.

Armed Forces Mission

-----------------------------

6. © The primary mission of all three services of the Argentine military is to protect the country’s territorial integrity. With the possible exception of the political instability in neighboring Bolivia, there are no immediate threats to Argentina. The country is at peace and has transparent, well developed military cooperation with Brazil, Chile and with its smaller neighbors Paraguay and Uruguay.

Argentina,s only territorial dispute concerns the Falkland/Malvinas Islands. The GOA while stating that the resolution to the Falkland/Malvinas dispute cannot be solved militarily, still maintains its claims to the islands and its maritime spaces. This is compounded by President Kirchner being more politically provocative about the Argentine claim than any of his post-dictatorship predecessors.

Mil-Mil and Civ-Mil Relations

-------------------------------------

7. © We have excellent relations with the Argentine military and a sound working relationship with the MoD. Despite some policy differences with the MoD leadership (primarily over the issue of joint exercises), we have maintained an active program with the MoD and military. We should avoid short term reactions to the current political situation. Mil-Mil relations overall remain excellent in spite of recent difficulties over the past several years in executing programs with the Argentine Army. Pressure to reduce programs and resources and to stifle/discourage engagement with the Argentine Military is counterproductive. Now more than ever it is important to maintain professional contact with the Argentine military. This is the time when the USG should be augmenting our available tools, resources and efforts to obtain our long term security interests. Brooke Sanctions currently limit our ability to provide FMF and EDA but the Milgrp is otherwise fully engaged on other security assistance issues, including IMET, although the MoD is currently not sending students to any WHINSEC courses for political reasons.

8. © Argentine Civ-Mil relations are strained and unproductive. The Pol-Mil bilats take place at a time when the Argentine MoD (Nilda Garr) is attempting to complete an intense restructuring of the military under a 1988 law on restructuring the Armed Forces. The MOD has focused her organization on 1) financial economies of scale and operations, 2) “jointness,” and 3) peacekeeping operations. This reorganization, however, is taking place with little Service input, creating great uncertainty. MilGrp and DAO are trying to be constructive partners through this change. The MoD is seeking assistance in strategic planning, defense resource management, and developing and providing strategic guidance over the military. They are also looking for shared experiences on military transformation and strengthening &jointness8 as they undertake the task of restructuring and modernizing the Armed Forces.

“New Threats”

-------------

9. (SBU) The MoD is adamant that the military not be involved in addressing the &new transnational threats8 of terrorism, narcotrafficking, transnational crime, etc. The Minister of Defense incorrectly perceives the U.S. as trying to force our strategic vision on the region and to push the military to take on these missions. Under the restructuring, the mission of the Armed Forces will be very traditional, i.e. defending the country against aggression by another state. The MoD also envisions a disaster preparedness/response/humanitarian assistance role for the Armed Forces. As a result, MilGrp focuses CT and CN programs on the Prefectura (Coast Guard) and Gendarmerie (National Guard equivalent), which fall under the authority of the Ministry of Interior.

Possible Arms Acquisitions

--------------------------

10. (SBU) MoD Garre recently completed a trip to France, Ukraine and Russia, ostensibly to discuss possible weapons/ weapons systems purchases. The MoD has disavowed any specific plans, at this time, to make any significant purchases but it appears that the Russians are anxious to open up the Latin American market, to include establishing arms/equipment production facilities in a number of countries. Progress with Argentina would be a significant step in that direction. Brooks Sanctions preclude Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and Excess Defense Articles (EDA), although Foreign Military Sales (FMS) is available and a viable option the MoD should consider when looking at new equipment and systems.

Strong on Peacekeeping